On 10 March 1916, General Sir John Grenfell Maxwell was relieved as commander of the British forces in Egypt.
General Maxwell’s activities are often overlooked, especially when his relatively passive period in command is compared to the campaigning of Sir Archibald Murray and Sir Edmund Allenby later in the war. His reputation is also forever tarnished by his involvement in the crushing of the Easter Rising, after he was appointed Commander-in-Chief Ireland in late April 1916. However, Maxwell was a crucial figure in Egypt in the first 18 months of the war, especially as his responsibilities included administering the Martial Law that had been declared on the outbreak of war. Under those powers he had immense control over civil government and affairs, should he choose to use them.
Born in 1859, Maxwell had entered the Royal Military College at Sandhurst in 1878. He had been gazetted into the 42nd Foot (Black Watch) in 1879, and went with them to Egypt in 1882 when Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent to put down the uprising that had thrown out the European committee that had effective control of the country. It was this campaign that left Egypt a British colony in all but name.
In Egypt, Maxwell joined the staff of Sir Francis Grenfell, his mother’s cousin, in 1885 when he was appointed head of the Egyptian Army. Maxwell saw service in several campaigns in the Sudan and steadily rose through the ranks, receiving the DSO in 1885. When Sir Herbert (later Earl) Kitchener took over command in 1892, Maxwell stayed with the Egyptian Army and commanded troops in the campaigns of 1896 and 1898, including the Battle of Omdurman. He was also briefly the Governor of Nubia.
Maxwell left Egypt in 1900 to serve in South Africa, and after the Boer War he held staff positions in Ireland and Malta before returning to Egypt as the Commanding Officer of British Troops in 1908 as a Major-General. In 1912 Maxwell retired to England on half-pay.
On the outbreak of the First World War, Maxwell rejoined the colours and was sent briefly to France, before resuming his old post in Egypt in September 1914. He faced a difficult task, protecting Egypt, with the strategically important Suez Canal, with only a few, poorly trained troops, while also overseeing the tricky political position of Egypt.
Egypt was technically still part of the Ottoman Empire, and anti-British and nationalist feelings were rife. There was a widespread fear that a war with the Ottomans would lead to rebellion in Egypt, which the British would not be able to contain. However, when the Ottomans attacked Russia on 29 October 1914, Britain had no choice but to declare war on them. On 2 November 1914 Martial Law was declared in Egypt, and on 18 December the country was officially announced to be a British Protectorate.
Martial Law gave the British Army, and Maxwell in particular, immense powers, but balanced against them was the ever-present threat of a nationalist uprising. Over the next 18 months Maxwell used his powers lightly and in moderation wherever possible, making sure that he balanced British and Egyptian interests. In areas such a legal reforms, agriculture and infrastructure, he did his best to improve the lot of the average Egyptian and keep nationalist feelings at bay. For example, the ‘Capitulations’, old agreements with the Ottoman government that effectively made Europeans exempt from Egyptian law, were suspended or scraped completely in certain areas. These had, understandably, been massively unpopular with the people.
In other areas he walked a finer line. In agriculture, certain policies had been implemented on the outbreak of war to secure the supply of food. Egypt imported a high proportion of its food, and some of those sources were being cut off by the war (such as the 30% of its wheat that had come from Russia), while the army now needed to feed significant numbers of troops. As a knee-jerk reaction, food commissions were set up across the country, buying up all surpluses and banning exports. Unfortunately, each commission could set its own rates, and the disparity across regions caused significant discontent as neighbours on either side of a demarcation line could receive significantly different prices for the same goods. At the same time, decrees were issued limiting what percentage of their land could be used for cotton, which was far more lucrative then cotton, so that more food could be grown.
On the other hand, the army offered a guaranteed market for food (and other, non-agricultural products), and after the initial problems with the food commissions were ironed out, a fair and relatively high price was set which returned a healthy profit to the farmers. In September 1915 the restrictions on cotton production were also eased, again allowing higher profits. These policies would, unfortunately, lead to problems with food shortages for the population in 1917 and 1918, but these were as much due to Maxwell’s successors’ failure to continue to closely monitor and deal with the situation.
Another short term benefit established by Maxwell that would unfortunately turn sour towards the end of the war was the employment of local labour. Men were recruited on short, three-month contracts to help with the construction of defences or infrastructure, or herd animals for the army. Facing only short periods away from home and for decent wages, thousands of Egyptians welcomed a development that would, again, cause problems further down the line. By 1917 the army had to extend the contracts as it moved further away from Egypt, and eventually began to forcibly conscript Egyptians to make sure it had enough labour, leading to widespread discontent.
Maxwell’s actions were not only limited to the welfare of the Egyptian people or even the British forces. After the Battle of the Suez Canal, when large numbers of Ottoman troops had been captured, Maxwell (working with Prince Ahmed Faud, later King of Egypt, as the figurehead) established the Red Crescent Society, specifically to act as the equivalent of the Red Cross in supporting his Muslim prisoners.
General Maxwell’s activities are often overlooked, especially when his relatively passive period in command is compared to the campaigning of Sir Archibald Murray and Sir Edmund Allenby later in the war. His reputation is also forever tarnished by his involvement in the crushing of the Easter Rising, after he was appointed Commander-in-Chief Ireland in late April 1916. However, Maxwell was a crucial figure in Egypt in the first 18 months of the war, especially as his responsibilities included administering the Martial Law that had been declared on the outbreak of war. Under those powers he had immense control over civil government and affairs, should he choose to use them.
Born in 1859, Maxwell had entered the Royal Military College at Sandhurst in 1878. He had been gazetted into the 42nd Foot (Black Watch) in 1879, and went with them to Egypt in 1882 when Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent to put down the uprising that had thrown out the European committee that had effective control of the country. It was this campaign that left Egypt a British colony in all but name.
In Egypt, Maxwell joined the staff of Sir Francis Grenfell, his mother’s cousin, in 1885 when he was appointed head of the Egyptian Army. Maxwell saw service in several campaigns in the Sudan and steadily rose through the ranks, receiving the DSO in 1885. When Sir Herbert (later Earl) Kitchener took over command in 1892, Maxwell stayed with the Egyptian Army and commanded troops in the campaigns of 1896 and 1898, including the Battle of Omdurman. He was also briefly the Governor of Nubia.
Maxwell left Egypt in 1900 to serve in South Africa, and after the Boer War he held staff positions in Ireland and Malta before returning to Egypt as the Commanding Officer of British Troops in 1908 as a Major-General. In 1912 Maxwell retired to England on half-pay.
On the outbreak of the First World War, Maxwell rejoined the colours and was sent briefly to France, before resuming his old post in Egypt in September 1914. He faced a difficult task, protecting Egypt, with the strategically important Suez Canal, with only a few, poorly trained troops, while also overseeing the tricky political position of Egypt.
Egypt was technically still part of the Ottoman Empire, and anti-British and nationalist feelings were rife. There was a widespread fear that a war with the Ottomans would lead to rebellion in Egypt, which the British would not be able to contain. However, when the Ottomans attacked Russia on 29 October 1914, Britain had no choice but to declare war on them. On 2 November 1914 Martial Law was declared in Egypt, and on 18 December the country was officially announced to be a British Protectorate.
Martial Law gave the British Army, and Maxwell in particular, immense powers, but balanced against them was the ever-present threat of a nationalist uprising. Over the next 18 months Maxwell used his powers lightly and in moderation wherever possible, making sure that he balanced British and Egyptian interests. In areas such a legal reforms, agriculture and infrastructure, he did his best to improve the lot of the average Egyptian and keep nationalist feelings at bay. For example, the ‘Capitulations’, old agreements with the Ottoman government that effectively made Europeans exempt from Egyptian law, were suspended or scraped completely in certain areas. These had, understandably, been massively unpopular with the people.
In other areas he walked a finer line. In agriculture, certain policies had been implemented on the outbreak of war to secure the supply of food. Egypt imported a high proportion of its food, and some of those sources were being cut off by the war (such as the 30% of its wheat that had come from Russia), while the army now needed to feed significant numbers of troops. As a knee-jerk reaction, food commissions were set up across the country, buying up all surpluses and banning exports. Unfortunately, each commission could set its own rates, and the disparity across regions caused significant discontent as neighbours on either side of a demarcation line could receive significantly different prices for the same goods. At the same time, decrees were issued limiting what percentage of their land could be used for cotton, which was far more lucrative then cotton, so that more food could be grown.
On the other hand, the army offered a guaranteed market for food (and other, non-agricultural products), and after the initial problems with the food commissions were ironed out, a fair and relatively high price was set which returned a healthy profit to the farmers. In September 1915 the restrictions on cotton production were also eased, again allowing higher profits. These policies would, unfortunately, lead to problems with food shortages for the population in 1917 and 1918, but these were as much due to Maxwell’s successors’ failure to continue to closely monitor and deal with the situation.
Another short term benefit established by Maxwell that would unfortunately turn sour towards the end of the war was the employment of local labour. Men were recruited on short, three-month contracts to help with the construction of defences or infrastructure, or herd animals for the army. Facing only short periods away from home and for decent wages, thousands of Egyptians welcomed a development that would, again, cause problems further down the line. By 1917 the army had to extend the contracts as it moved further away from Egypt, and eventually began to forcibly conscript Egyptians to make sure it had enough labour, leading to widespread discontent.
Maxwell’s actions were not only limited to the welfare of the Egyptian people or even the British forces. After the Battle of the Suez Canal, when large numbers of Ottoman troops had been captured, Maxwell (working with Prince Ahmed Faud, later King of Egypt, as the figurehead) established the Red Crescent Society, specifically to act as the equivalent of the Red Cross in supporting his Muslim prisoners.
On the military side, Maxwell also made some important contributions, even if he was sometimes later criticised for not taking them further. He greatly improved the defences of the Suez Canal, even though he often had to work with very limited manpower and resources as his primary mission during 1915 became supporting the forces in Gallipoli. He greatly improved the infrastructure of the Canal Zone, working with the Egyptian State Railway to build 250 miles of new railway track, as well as 100 miles of new or improved roads. He developed the Canal into a more suitable base for military operations, building wharves and docking facilities at several points (most notably Kantara, later the main depot for the EEF as it advanced into Palestine), plus establishing eight pontoon bridges that could be swung back to allow shipping to pass, and more modern ferries. A massive amount of effort also went into building water systems; these pumped, filtered and then stored huge amounts of fresh water from the Nile Valley out to the Canal Zone, in order to supply the thousands of soldiers and labourers who operated there.
Maxwell would later be criticized for using the Canal itself as the main line of defence, but this is an unreasonably and unfair suggestion. Maxwell himself complained about the necessity of doing so to the War Office, but he had little practical choice while his garrison was being constantly depleted to feed men into the Dardanelles; at times he had as few as 15,000 men to hold the 100-mile long Canal, as well as garrison the rest of the country and fend off attacks from the Senussi in the Western Desert. In truth, he made what preparations he could; defensive posts and redoubts were established on the eastern side of the Canal, and they were expanded as far as his troop numbers allowed. He also extended the water pipelines and the light railways onto that side of the Canal, ready to support larger formations as soon as they were available. From February 1916, it was Maxwell who began to build the vital railway and pipeline that would supply the EEF across the Sinai and into Palestine.
Maxwell was also criticised for not collecting enough camels for the army to support large numbers of men out in the desert. In fact, Maxwell had began to collect camels in November 1915, and any efforts before that would have been wasted as he did not have enough troops to operate in the Sinai anyway. In that month an order was placed for 20,000 camels to carry supplies. But even in Egypt the procurement of camels was not that easy. Egypt’s main supply of animals came from Arabia, and the war had cut off this route. Instead, camels had to be purchased and transported from the Sudan, Somaliland, and even India to reach the amount needed. In fact, a total of 150,000 were gathered in December 1915 and January 1916, of which a mere 13,000 were considered as fit for active duty. Mange was a particular problem, with some 60-70% of Egyptian camels suffering to some degree. In the end, many of the less severe cases had to be purchased anyway simply to make up numbers, and in the first three months of 1916 alone 16,067 were treated in the army’s three Camel Veterinary Hospitals.
When the army returned from Gallipoli, many prominent officers were highly critical of Maxwell’s achievements in Egypt. Much of this was unjustified and must surely have been more a case of men who had themselves just suffered a major failure lashing out to cover their own feelings of inadequacy. However, some criticisms of the condition of the army in Egypt were correct, even if they were hardly Maxwell’s fault. For example, the command structure had become hopelessly tangled. Base units for the forces in Gallipoli and Salonika had vied with those responsible for the defence of Egypt, causing endless confusion over who commanded or was responsible for what. This situation became worse when Sir Archibald Murray and his Mediterranean Expeditionary Force returned to Egypt in early 1916.
This issue came to a head when both Maxwell and Murray appealed to London for some kind of resolution to the problem, both offering to stand down if need be. On 10 March 1916 the answer arrived from London: Murray was to take command of all of the forces in Egypt, and Maxwell was to return to the UK. The same order established the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
Sir Ronald Storrs, a pre-war civil servant in the Egyptian administration and an astute observer, wrote in his memoirs that:
“The recall of Maxwell evoked one of the most spontaneous outbursts of general regret that I have seen during twelve years’ residence here.”
It is an oft-overlooked fact that Maxwell was also effectively responsible for the civil administration of Egypt, which took considerable time and effort, and which he performed very well. This was the main difference between Maxwell and his successors. The bulk of the army viewed Egypt as an area of land from which to launch military operations, with little concern for the local population, economy, politics or administration. After spending most of his career in Egypt and the Sudan, Maxwell on the other hand had a wealth of experience and a feel for the country and its people. Storrs again:
“I keep a clear memory of Sir John Maxwell, the General Officer Commanding the Troops. During the previous decade he had been employed in administrative rather than on active service, but for those initiatory days of transition he proved exactly what was required; knowing and liking, known and liked by, Egyptians for the past thirty years. Sitting tunicless in his office he would see every applicant and read most petitions personally, dealing out a summary justice which expressed itself by speech or by a stub of the blue pencil in a brief convincing expletive. It was no good bluffing, for “Conkey” had your life-history – whether you were a Pasha or a dragoman, a Sephardi Banker or a Greek cotton broker, a British official or a Syrian Consul-General for a Baltic State; but this patriarchal militarism provided a satisfaction, a finality, very seldom afforded by the Mixed Court of Appeal.”
Field Marshal Edmund Allenby, who would replace Murray in 1917 and go on to conquer Palestine and Syria, would write in his final despatch that his victory owed it’s foundations to Murray for his work on the laying the pipeline that ‘brought the waters of the Nile to the borders of Palestine’ and building a ‘standard gauge railway to the gates of Gaza.’ While Murray certainly saw both of these projects to fruition, it was Maxwell who had begun them, as well as beginning the recruitment of the men and animals of the Egyptian Labour Corps and Camel Transport Corps, whose sweat and muscle would carry the army across the Sinai. His deft handling of Martial Law and the civil administration in Egypt provided a secure base for the army, but are now overshadowed by the later events that have tarnished his reputation.
It is deeply unfortunate that a man who had always held the needs and concerns of the average Egyptian so central to his decisions is now better remembered for the brutality that followed the Easter Rising.
Maxwell would later be criticized for using the Canal itself as the main line of defence, but this is an unreasonably and unfair suggestion. Maxwell himself complained about the necessity of doing so to the War Office, but he had little practical choice while his garrison was being constantly depleted to feed men into the Dardanelles; at times he had as few as 15,000 men to hold the 100-mile long Canal, as well as garrison the rest of the country and fend off attacks from the Senussi in the Western Desert. In truth, he made what preparations he could; defensive posts and redoubts were established on the eastern side of the Canal, and they were expanded as far as his troop numbers allowed. He also extended the water pipelines and the light railways onto that side of the Canal, ready to support larger formations as soon as they were available. From February 1916, it was Maxwell who began to build the vital railway and pipeline that would supply the EEF across the Sinai and into Palestine.
Maxwell was also criticised for not collecting enough camels for the army to support large numbers of men out in the desert. In fact, Maxwell had began to collect camels in November 1915, and any efforts before that would have been wasted as he did not have enough troops to operate in the Sinai anyway. In that month an order was placed for 20,000 camels to carry supplies. But even in Egypt the procurement of camels was not that easy. Egypt’s main supply of animals came from Arabia, and the war had cut off this route. Instead, camels had to be purchased and transported from the Sudan, Somaliland, and even India to reach the amount needed. In fact, a total of 150,000 were gathered in December 1915 and January 1916, of which a mere 13,000 were considered as fit for active duty. Mange was a particular problem, with some 60-70% of Egyptian camels suffering to some degree. In the end, many of the less severe cases had to be purchased anyway simply to make up numbers, and in the first three months of 1916 alone 16,067 were treated in the army’s three Camel Veterinary Hospitals.
When the army returned from Gallipoli, many prominent officers were highly critical of Maxwell’s achievements in Egypt. Much of this was unjustified and must surely have been more a case of men who had themselves just suffered a major failure lashing out to cover their own feelings of inadequacy. However, some criticisms of the condition of the army in Egypt were correct, even if they were hardly Maxwell’s fault. For example, the command structure had become hopelessly tangled. Base units for the forces in Gallipoli and Salonika had vied with those responsible for the defence of Egypt, causing endless confusion over who commanded or was responsible for what. This situation became worse when Sir Archibald Murray and his Mediterranean Expeditionary Force returned to Egypt in early 1916.
This issue came to a head when both Maxwell and Murray appealed to London for some kind of resolution to the problem, both offering to stand down if need be. On 10 March 1916 the answer arrived from London: Murray was to take command of all of the forces in Egypt, and Maxwell was to return to the UK. The same order established the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
Sir Ronald Storrs, a pre-war civil servant in the Egyptian administration and an astute observer, wrote in his memoirs that:
“The recall of Maxwell evoked one of the most spontaneous outbursts of general regret that I have seen during twelve years’ residence here.”
It is an oft-overlooked fact that Maxwell was also effectively responsible for the civil administration of Egypt, which took considerable time and effort, and which he performed very well. This was the main difference between Maxwell and his successors. The bulk of the army viewed Egypt as an area of land from which to launch military operations, with little concern for the local population, economy, politics or administration. After spending most of his career in Egypt and the Sudan, Maxwell on the other hand had a wealth of experience and a feel for the country and its people. Storrs again:
“I keep a clear memory of Sir John Maxwell, the General Officer Commanding the Troops. During the previous decade he had been employed in administrative rather than on active service, but for those initiatory days of transition he proved exactly what was required; knowing and liking, known and liked by, Egyptians for the past thirty years. Sitting tunicless in his office he would see every applicant and read most petitions personally, dealing out a summary justice which expressed itself by speech or by a stub of the blue pencil in a brief convincing expletive. It was no good bluffing, for “Conkey” had your life-history – whether you were a Pasha or a dragoman, a Sephardi Banker or a Greek cotton broker, a British official or a Syrian Consul-General for a Baltic State; but this patriarchal militarism provided a satisfaction, a finality, very seldom afforded by the Mixed Court of Appeal.”
Field Marshal Edmund Allenby, who would replace Murray in 1917 and go on to conquer Palestine and Syria, would write in his final despatch that his victory owed it’s foundations to Murray for his work on the laying the pipeline that ‘brought the waters of the Nile to the borders of Palestine’ and building a ‘standard gauge railway to the gates of Gaza.’ While Murray certainly saw both of these projects to fruition, it was Maxwell who had begun them, as well as beginning the recruitment of the men and animals of the Egyptian Labour Corps and Camel Transport Corps, whose sweat and muscle would carry the army across the Sinai. His deft handling of Martial Law and the civil administration in Egypt provided a secure base for the army, but are now overshadowed by the later events that have tarnished his reputation.
It is deeply unfortunate that a man who had always held the needs and concerns of the average Egyptian so central to his decisions is now better remembered for the brutality that followed the Easter Rising.