Desert Victory: The Battle of Romani, August 1916
In August 1916, the Ottoman Empire made its third, and last, attempt to cut Britain’s vital supply line to its eastern Empire, the Suez Canal. Their attacking force ran into a carefully laid British trap at Romani. Although the coming battle matched the preconceived British plan to a remarkable degree, it was still a hard-slogging fight and disaster threatened more than once. Stuart Hadaway looks at the battle that finally secured British control of the Sinai Desert, and opened the road to Palestine.
In July 1916, the German Colonel Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein set out across the Sinai Desert to attack the Suez Canal. This was a prime strategic target, the cutting of which would throw the British Imperial war machine into chaos. Men and raw materials flowed through the Canal day and night from the east, feeding the factories of Britain, France and Italy, as well as bringing fresh troops for the Western Front. Kress von Kressenstein had already made one attempt to cut the Canal in April 1916. Acting under intense pressure from the German High Command, that attack had lacked preparations and troop numbers, and had ground to halt when it encountered the British Yeomen of the 5th Mounted Brigade around the wells at Oghratina and Katia. While the British force had suffered crushing casualties, the Ottomans had also received a bloody nose and withdrawn. Now, he was back with the 3rd (OT) Infantry Division, consisting of the battle-hardened veterans of the 31st, 32nd and 39th (OT) Regiments, each the equivalent to a British brigade. They were joined by large numbers of Austrian and German machine gunners and artillerymen, giving the force a far higher proportion of fire support than was usual in Ottoman formations. In all, Kress von Kressenstein mustered 16,000 men, of whom 11-12,000 were front line troops.
In July 1916, the German Colonel Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein set out across the Sinai Desert to attack the Suez Canal. This was a prime strategic target, the cutting of which would throw the British Imperial war machine into chaos. Men and raw materials flowed through the Canal day and night from the east, feeding the factories of Britain, France and Italy, as well as bringing fresh troops for the Western Front. Kress von Kressenstein had already made one attempt to cut the Canal in April 1916. Acting under intense pressure from the German High Command, that attack had lacked preparations and troop numbers, and had ground to halt when it encountered the British Yeomen of the 5th Mounted Brigade around the wells at Oghratina and Katia. While the British force had suffered crushing casualties, the Ottomans had also received a bloody nose and withdrawn. Now, he was back with the 3rd (OT) Infantry Division, consisting of the battle-hardened veterans of the 31st, 32nd and 39th (OT) Regiments, each the equivalent to a British brigade. They were joined by large numbers of Austrian and German machine gunners and artillerymen, giving the force a far higher proportion of fire support than was usual in Ottoman formations. In all, Kress von Kressenstein mustered 16,000 men, of whom 11-12,000 were front line troops.
The British, warned by the April attack, had also been making preparations. They had gone to ground at Romani, a natural defensive position behind a maze of sand dunes and hills that made the approaches difficult and would break up any enemy attack. There were good water sources here, too, while a railway was being built from the Suez Canal out to Romani to supply the forces there. The British force was under the command of Major General the Honourable Herbert Lawrence, Commanding Officer of the 52nd (Lowland) Division. At his disposal were his own division (temporarily under General W. E. B. Smith), and the Australian and New Zealand (A&NZ) Mounted Division under Major General ‘Light Horse’ Harry Chauvel. For the battle, the 158th Brigade from 53rd (Welsh) Division was attached to the Lowlanders, although the 3rd Australian Light Horse (ALH) Brigade was detached from Chauvel’s division. Various other formations were moving up from or protecting the rear, including brigades of the 42nd (East Lancs) Division, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles (NZMR) Brigade, some Camel Corps troops and the battered remains of the 5th Mounted Brigade, Lawrence would have a front-line strength of about 14,000 men for the coming fight, and would be extremely short of artillery.
Lawrence split his position into two distinct areas, even though they formed a continuous line. The 52nd Division was placed on a north-south line in a series of heavily dug-in redoubts, protected by barbed wire and machine guns. With its left flank close to the sea, where the Royal Navy waited to give fire support, Lawrence did not think that the Ottomans would attack here. He believed that they would attempt to swing around his right flank, to the south, aiming to come up behind him and cut him off from Egypt to the west. Therefore he designed a trap. After establishing the right flank of his infantry on the hill at Katib Gannit, he continued the line south for another four miles with his cavalry.
Although Chauvel had two ALH brigades, only one would stay and hold the line at any one time. In the weeks leading up to the battle one of his brigades rode out in the early hours each day to patrol the area and harass the enemy. These troops would usually return long after dark, sometimes close to midnight, and catch a few hours’ rest before taking over the defensive line so that the other brigade could ride out. This was an exhausting schedule to maintain. Meanwhile, by Lawrence’s orders, the piquet line that they maintained was totally undeveloped. No trenches, strong points or even barbed wire were allowed, in order to hide its presence from the enemy. Two regiments from each brigade manned it at a time, with the third regiment in reserve. With the units under-strength, this left the line perilously thin, with piquets of 4-8 men spread out about a hundred metres apart. However, they were positioned to watch and cover all of the approaching alleys through the maze of sand dunes, and in the case of an attack they were never meant to form a proper defensive line. Instead, the horsemen were supposed to stage a fighting retreat, swinging on the hinge of Katib Gannit back until they were at a 90-degree angle to their original line, and holding a strong line of ridges and hills (named for various commanders and units in the division). They were to draw the Ottomans up behind them until their main attacking force was heading north. At this point, cavalry and infantry units to the west would be able to sweep into the Ottoman’s open left flank, and roll them up.
Lawrence split his position into two distinct areas, even though they formed a continuous line. The 52nd Division was placed on a north-south line in a series of heavily dug-in redoubts, protected by barbed wire and machine guns. With its left flank close to the sea, where the Royal Navy waited to give fire support, Lawrence did not think that the Ottomans would attack here. He believed that they would attempt to swing around his right flank, to the south, aiming to come up behind him and cut him off from Egypt to the west. Therefore he designed a trap. After establishing the right flank of his infantry on the hill at Katib Gannit, he continued the line south for another four miles with his cavalry.
Although Chauvel had two ALH brigades, only one would stay and hold the line at any one time. In the weeks leading up to the battle one of his brigades rode out in the early hours each day to patrol the area and harass the enemy. These troops would usually return long after dark, sometimes close to midnight, and catch a few hours’ rest before taking over the defensive line so that the other brigade could ride out. This was an exhausting schedule to maintain. Meanwhile, by Lawrence’s orders, the piquet line that they maintained was totally undeveloped. No trenches, strong points or even barbed wire were allowed, in order to hide its presence from the enemy. Two regiments from each brigade manned it at a time, with the third regiment in reserve. With the units under-strength, this left the line perilously thin, with piquets of 4-8 men spread out about a hundred metres apart. However, they were positioned to watch and cover all of the approaching alleys through the maze of sand dunes, and in the case of an attack they were never meant to form a proper defensive line. Instead, the horsemen were supposed to stage a fighting retreat, swinging on the hinge of Katib Gannit back until they were at a 90-degree angle to their original line, and holding a strong line of ridges and hills (named for various commanders and units in the division). They were to draw the Ottomans up behind them until their main attacking force was heading north. At this point, cavalry and infantry units to the west would be able to sweep into the Ottoman’s open left flank, and roll them up.